1. Field
Various features relate to communications systems and, more particularly, to the authentication of devices, such as relay nodes and machine-to-machine devices, employed in a wired and/or wireless communications system.
2. Background
Modern wireless networks may include relay nodes and/or access terminals, cumulatively referred to here as devices. In order for such a device to function properly, the device is often provisioned/configured with operational and subscriber security credentials before the device is put into operation. Such subscriber security credentials may be used to, for example, authenticate the device prior providing wireless service or access and, in some cases, may be stored in a module that irremovably couples to its host device. A risk exists that subscriber security credentials may be removed from an authenticated device and placed in an unauthorized device. In the case of a relay node, this may allow an unauthorized relay node to surreptitiously access transmissions, for example, between an access node and one or more access terminals and/or to obtain free access to network services. This risk or vulnerability also exists in the case of machine-to-machine (M2M) devices in that valid subscriber credentials (e.g., authentication and key agreement—(AKA) parameters in a removable Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)) in a M2M device could be transferred to another device in order to gain free network access. A related vulnerability exists in that it is not necessary to have physical access to the M2M device itself. Access to the data (e.g., the security keys resulting from authentication) that is going across a M2M device interface (e.g., host device to UICC interface) is sufficient to gain access to security keys and expose data secured by said keys.
A similar issue exists if an operator wishes to control which devices are allowed to access their network.
Consequently, there is a need to provide additional security for devices to address these and other vulnerabilities and risks.